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MARCELLA MILANA
4. EUROPEANISATION AND THE CHANGING 
NATURE OF THE (EUROPEAN) STATE
Implications for Studying Adult and Lifelong Education1
INTRODUCTION 
Drawing on contributions from state theory, European studies and education, this 
chapter problematises how the changing nature of the state restricts or amplifies 
member states’ political space. In particular, part one outlines how changes that occurred 
with the European Union (EU) led to the subsidiarity principle in education to be by-
passed, generating a new scenario for European policy work in education. Although 
this process, generally captured under the label of Europeanisation, has reinforced a 
shift in legitimate authority from member states to EU institutions, my argument is 
that the authoritative backing of political agencies from within member states is still an 
important aspect of EU policy work. Against this scenario, part two pays close attention 
to the organisational means by which the state works, so as to capture the changing 
nature of legitimate authority by and within member states. Here I argue that European 
policy work in education is increasingly a matter of individual, organisational and inter-
systemic negotiation and coordination across member states (and its array of political 
agencies) and the EU (and its diverse political institutions) as a pooling of sovereignty. 
The chapter concludes with a few considerations on the implications of bringing the 
state back into the study of adult and lifelong education policies in Europe. Specifically, 
this implies raising a rather different set of questions from those addressed when either 
excluding or underestimating member states’ political space. 
EUROPEANISATION, EU-ISATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
Education is an area that falls within the exclusive competence of member states; 
thus it is subject to the principle of subsidiarity. While this legal position might 
easily lead to the assumption that European policy work in education has not 
changed over the last 20 years, it has, dramatically! Starting with a brief account of 
EU competence in this area, I proceed to unpack the changes that have led the EU to 
by-pass (to a certain extent) the principle of subsidiarity in education, which in turn 
has reinforced a shift in legitimate authority from member states to EU institutions. 
Despite this shift, however, I argue that the EU still needs the authoritative backing 
of political agencies within member states.
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A Glance at the Treaties
In 2010 education (and vocational training) was recalled in the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community (now Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) as 
among the competence areas of the EU that are subject to the subsidiarity principle.
The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate 
or supplement the actions of the member States. The areas of such action shall, 
at European level, be: . . . (e) education, vocational training, youth and sport 
(TFEU, 2010, art. 6).2 
Yet the specificity of EU action in this area, prior to its having been incorporated in 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2010), was already spelled out in 
the Treaty on European Union (1992), better known as the Maastricht Treaty (see 
also Rasmussen, this volume).
The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education 
by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, 
by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity 
(TEU, 1992, ch. 3, art. 126, para. 1).3
Article 126 (now art. 149) has remained unchanged in its wording ever since; and so 
has the principle of subsidiarity. Yet, several scholars have devoted attention to the 
subtle dynamics that can explain the vivid changes that have occurred in European 
policy work. 
Europeanisation Through Education
In the words of Grek and her colleagues:
Europeanization is the process of formation of the European Union, the 
processes which are attached loosely or formally to this formation, or set in 
motion by it (Grek at al., 2009: 112).
The specificity of such a process of formation of the European Union has been 
addressed by Klatt (this volume). My concern here is how Europeanisation mingles 
with education.
The creation of a European education space had started long before the appearance 
of the EU. Its grounding principles can be found in post-1945 Europe, when 
educationalists from Europe, either in their capacity as professionals, researchers or 
policymakers, networked across borders, partly thanks to inputs by major comparative 
educationalists (Lawn & Grek, 2012). A key turning point for institutionalising the 
exchanges of knowledge and ideas around a European Educational Space, Pépin 
(2006) claims, can be found in For a Community Policy on Education (1973); a 
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report commissioned to Henri Janne, former Belgian Minister of Education. As we 
can read in its Preface: 
The Commission of the European Communities, realizing that its responsibility 
for developing Community policies extends to the field of education . . . asked 
Professor Henri Janne . . . to formulate the first principles of an education policy 
at Community level . . . The Members of the Commission of the European 
Communities welcomed the report enthusiastically . . . particularly as the new 
Commission attaches so much significance to the questions of education policy 
it has to deal with (Janne, 1973: 5).
The report renders explicit how a Community education policy is in line with the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957), better known as 
the Treaty of Rome due to its links with the economic need for training at a time of 
Community expansion.
Thus there is ‘awareness’ of the fact that the economic (and therefore 
‘professional’) needs for training are not separable from the education system 
in general . . . Coherence in one field calls for coherence in the other, and an 
operation of ‘approximation’ or ‘harmonization’ of the policies – carried out 
with the necessary prudence – is indispensable (Janne, 1973: 11).
The policy principles of ‘approximation’ or ‘harmonisation’ have since been at the core of 
the European Educational Space, and have been promoted over time via cross-European 
projects and activities run in partnership between a multiplicity of European associations 
of universities, schools, trade unions etc., with the support of the European Commission. 
By the late ’90s, the development of specific programmes such as Erasmus, Socrates, 
Leonardo, and Comenius had come to play a major role in supporting joint Europe-wide 
education projects across sectors (Lawn & Grek, 2012; Pépin, 2006). 
This confirms that networking, cross-dissemination of ideas, and brokering across 
national borders, institutions, educational sub-systems, and productive sectors has 
always been centrally backed in the formation of a European Educational Space 
(Dale & Robertson, 2009; Grek et al., 2009), and continues to be so, also thanks 
to the creation of stronger links across specific programmes under the Lifelong 
Learning (now Erasmus+) programme (see Rasmussen, this volume). However, it is 
the 2000 Lisbon summit that represents a landmark in EU policy work in education, 
as we have come to know it in current times. At the Lisbon summit the Heads of EU 
governments approved a common strategy that
Implicitly give[s] the Union the mandate to develop a common interest 
approach in education going beyond national diversities as can be seen in the 
demand of Ministries of Education to debate common objectives of educational 
systems (Hingel, 2001: 15).
Accordingly, Ertl (2006) called the Strategy a “turning point” in the process of 
“unionization” (Nóvoa & de Jong-Lambert, 2003) of education policies – in an 
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area that is still officially within the exclusive competence of member states. In line 
with this argument, Nóvoa (2002: 133) spoke of the Strategy as the precondition 
for the EU to function as “a regulatory ideal” because it gives the EU a power to 
influence national policies that goes beyond existing diversity in national education 
and training systems, and thus by-passes the  subsidiarity principle. 
To date there is a shared consensus among educationalists that the Lisbon summit 
represents a landmark in the history of EU policy work in education, and very few, 
if any, would call it into question. Although not enforced via binding regulations, 
directives, or decisions4, EU leverage occurs through new governance mechanisms; 
mechanisms that were introduced by Directorates General other that the Directorate 
General for Education and Culture, but institutionalised at the Lisbon summit also 
for the governance of education (Bruno, Jacquot & Mandin, 2006). Accordingly, 
much post-Lisbon policy research has brought to the foreground the functioning of 
these new governance mechanisms, against the background of Europeanisation as its 
driving force. This however has often closed off considerations of political agency 
by and within member states; political agency that exists despite and sometimes by 
means of these very mechanisms. Let me elaborate on this statement by pointing at 
a few issues emerging from European studies literature. 
Europeanisation versus EU-isation. Europeanisation is by and large assumed to be the 
totality of political, legal and social processes that constitutes and explains both the cause 
and effect of the EU (see quotation from Grek and her colleagues above); the emergence 
and development of “distinct structures of governance . . . specializing in the creation 
of authoritative European rules” (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2000: 3) that direct and 
shape national politics (Ladrech, 1994: 69). Such “conceptual stretching”, as Radaelli 
(2002) pointed out, is primarily concerned with the identification of the set of qualities 
covered under the umbrella of Europeanisation, that is to say the extension to which the 
concept applies, rather than with clarifying the type of entities to which Europeanisation 
applies, namely its conceptual intentions. As a result, a certain degree of Europeanisation 
is found everywhere in the literature, often without clarifying what falls outside such 
a concept. This recalls what Sartori (1991) addressed as “degreeism”, specifically the 
problem of a concept that does not distinguish between A and B, but rather addresses 
the entire A-B continuum. While theoretically relevant, degreeism tends to reduce the 
analytical power of a concept. It is in line with this argument that Radaelli (2002: 105) 
coined “EU-isation” to capture, specifically, the national effect of EU public policy. 
From this viewpoint, Europeanisation is an all-encompassing concept that 
incorporates both EU policy formation processes and their outcomes. EU-isation, on 
the contrary, focuses specifically on mechanisms for public policy formation within 
the EU that work either vertically or horizontally. While the former makes reference 
to policies that are defined at an EU level and prescribes models to be implemented 
at a national level, through pressure and/or coercive mechanisms, the latter addresses 
changes in domestic policies that are triggered by policies defined at the EU level. 
Accordingly, EU-isation captures and explains better both policy convergence and 
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policy divergence. In other words, despite the EU’s harmonising intentions, EU-
isation draws attention to differential changes in domestic policy that weaken, alarm 
or strengthen EU member states (Börzel, 1999: 111).
Shift in authority. No agreement exists on whether or not the EU should be 
considered a ‘state’. Yet, there is a certain degree of accord around the fact that the EU 
“possess[es] governmental institutions and policy-making machinery and therefore 
invites comparison with known state forms” (Delanty & Rumford, 2005: 137). 
When we consider traditional state functions, such as the existence of a political-
administrative system, the regulation of relations between individuals and collectives 
within a given territory, and the steering of socio-political development in the pursuit 
of a ‘common good’, the EU – in some measure – acts as a state-like institution (see 
also next section). Against this background, as Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006) 
pointed out, it is important to distinguish between the institutions that make laws 
and the process of law-making. When we extend such an observation more broadly 
to policymaking processes, thus incorporating also norm-setting, agenda-setting, 
and policy implementations processes, it is worth noticing that EU institutions, their 
interactions and outcomes need the authoritative backing of member states. In view of 
that, we shall acknowledge that the influence of EU institutions is “more in devising 
the proper tools, and less in negotiating an intergovernmental compromise, so as to 
achieve a consensus on strategic goals set in Lisbon” (Bruno et al., 2006: 521). At 
the same time, we shall not underestimate that devising and applying these tools 
or new government mechanisms also requires authoritative backing in one form or 
another. As a result, new governance mechanisms have undoubtedly shifted “patterns 
of authority and legitimacy in the EU” (Caporaso & Wittenbrinck, 2006: 474), and 
require more backing by expert authority such as from the European Commission 
(see also Klatt, this volume). Still, authority from legislative to executive powers 
within member states has also shifted, as Duina and Raunio (2007) contended, at 
least with reference to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (see Rasmussen, 
this volume). By recognising that the OMC tends to marginalise the participation 
of national parliaments in favour of national governments in EU policy formation 
processes, Duina and Raunio (2007) argued that the same mechanism “introduces 
new possibilities and dynamics in the institutional power struggles of the member 
states”. This is to suggest that knowledge produced though the OMC could be used 
by domestic legislative powers to better scrutinise and / or contrast their executive 
counterparts, so “at a time when national legislatures worldwide increasingly seem 
to lose relevance, the OMC can potentially give NPs [National Parliaments] new 
grounds for asserting themselves” (Duina & Raunio, 2007: 497).
Member states’ bargaining power. Member states still possess a certain degree of 
bargaining power in EU policy work; however their degree of success may depend 
on a number of factors. Arregui and Thompson (2009) drew special attention to a few 
perspectives of decision-making within the EU that help elucidate this point. One such 
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factor is member states’ network relations with other states, or the depth and breadth 
of cooperation in which a member state is involved, independently from its size or 
total population. Naurin and Lindhal (2008) noted, for instance, that big countries 
such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France, as well as smaller countries like 
Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands, possess a higher stock of network capital than, 
for instance, Spain or Italy. Another factor is member states’ interest in prioritising the 
issue under negotiation at the European level. An additional factor is country size, as 
small member states tend to have narrower interests, and thus clearer policy priorities, 
as compared to their bigger counterparts. Finally, an important factor is member states’ 
salience or “the extent to which a state is willing to put into effect its capabilities to 
influence other actors” (Arregui & Thompson, 2009: 671). These capacities include, but 
are not limited to, all those resources, relevant to the situation or issue at stake, which 
can be used to exert power. One such resource is the rotating Council presidency, as 
presidents have privileged access to knowledge about other member states’ positions, 
and thus are in a better position to craft compromise proposals that are as close as 
possible to their own position on a matter of common concern. Yet, the holding of the 
Council presidency, after the 2004 enlargement, seems to bring less opportunity for 
the presidency to exert bargaining power, as a higher effort is often needed to facilitate 
agreements between a larger number of states with more diverse positions, rather than 
on the pursuit of a presidency’s own country interests (Arregui & Thompson, 2009).
It shall be noted that Arregui and Thompson’s (2009) line of reasoning derives 
from the study of congruence and incongruence between the outcomes from EU 
legislative decision-making on controversial issues, and member states’ policy 
positions on such issues. Although Education is exempt from these legislative 
processes, but because the subsidiarity principle has been by-passed, it is reasonable 
to assume that these factors also affect, to some extent, consultation processes leading 
to soft law instruments, such as strategic documents approved by the Heads of EU 
governments (e.g. Lisbon strategy, 2010) or Communications and Action plans by 
the European Commission, later approved under Resolutions by either the European 
Parliament (e.g. Resolution on Adult Learning, 2008) or the European Council (e.g. 
Resolution on Lifelong Learning, 2002; Resolution on a Renewed European Agenda 
for Adult Learning, 2011). In fact, according to consultation procedures, when the 
European Commission makes a proposal to the European Parliament or the European 
Council, these institutions can only change the proposal unanimously or approve 
it by either qualified majority votes or unanimity. For that reason, expert authority 
by the European Commission can support or counteract member states’ bargaining 
power, depending on whether or not member states hold similar positions to that of 
the European Commission, or have been able to exert influence on the European 
Commission’s position. 
Direct and outside lobbying. From within member states diverse interest groups 
lobby EU policy, either directly or via leverage on national governments. When it 
comes to specifically lobbying EU legislation at both the European and national 
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levels, Dür and Mateo (2012) suggested that the interest groups that reach out more 
strongly at the EU level are those that are more influential at the national level. 
Such interest groups can either lobby EU institutions, particularly the European 
Commission or the European Parliament, or national political actors, who will defend 
their interest within those institutions. The literature on lobbying also suggests that 
interest groups’ success depends on the type and amount of resources (e.g. financial 
means, legitimacy, representation, knowledge and expertise, and information). Thus, 
business organisations gain better access to both the European Commission and 
national governments via direct lobbying, while citizens and citizenship associations 
have a stronger sway on national parliaments via outside lobbying aimed at 
influencing public opinion. In line with this argument, diverse interest groups have 
a variety of options to exert leverage with either EU and national governments, or 
national political programmes and legislation by elected parliaments, on educational 
as well as other matters.
In sum, in the post-Lisbon period the principle of subsidiarity in education has 
been by-passed to a certain degree thanks to a shift in legitimate authority from 
member states to shared institutions at the European level, as recent literature 
on Europeanisation and education also points out. Yet such emphases tend to 
underestimate that political agencies within member states also provide authoritative 
backing to the work of EU institutions; a backing that is played out by a multiplicity 
of political agencies, which include parliaments, governments and other interest 
groups active at both national and European levels. Member states’ backing occurs 
through different means, such as direct or outside lobbying, which are resource-
dependent; backing therefore varies across both sets of political actors and countries. 
Accordingly, new government mechanisms do not necessarily diminish member 
states’ authority tout court; rather they weaken, trigger or strengthen the legitimate 
authority of a specific set of political actors from within member states. Legitimate 
authority, and how it plays out in EU-member states’ relations, necessitates deeper 
understandings of the changing nature of the modern state.
THE STATE, ITS CHANGING NATURE AND EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP
The modern state is traditionally understood as the embodiment of organised 
political power, which is exercised through a set of arrangements with the scope to 
control specific fields of action (Poggi, 1990). Against the scenario depicted in the 
prior section, however, my attention here turns to the organisational means by which 
the state works, so as to capture the changing nature of legitimate authority by and 
within member states. With a point of departure in Weber’s (1978) conceptualisation 
of legitimate authority, I introduce Jessop’s (2007) approach to the state, and bring 
to light the functioning of strategic selectivity. By combining such perspectives 
with a multi-scalar governance approach, my position is that European policy 
work in education in the post-Lisbon period is increasingly a matter of individual, 
organisational and inter-systemic negotiation and coordination across member states 
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(and its array of political agencies) and the EU as a pooling of sovereignty (and its 
diverse political institutions). 
The State and its Legitimate Authority 
According to Weber (1970: 77-78) there is scarcely any task that some political 
association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always 
been exclusive and peculiar to those associations designated as political ones. 
Yet, what distinguishes the modern state from other political associations is its 
organisational structure based on a few principles: 
 – “a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (Weber, 1978: 54). 
Although such a monopoly may never be fully accomplished, the state is the only 
legitimising source who grants the ‘right’ to use physical force;
− a territorially-based organisation. Modern states, in fact, occupy clearly defined 
physical spaces;
− a binding authority in the area of its jurisdiction, embodied by the very idea that 
no other political agent can contrast the will of the sovereign state within its 
territorial boundaries; and
 – an administrative and legislative organisation by which sovereignty is exercised, 
which in Weber’s (1978) words is “bureaucratic” in its very essence. Public 
bureaucracy is based on a hierarchy that defines state officials’ responsibilities, 
on the adoption of fixed rules and procedures, on specialised knowledge or 
expertise of administrative procedures, on impartial applications of general rules 
to particular cases, and last but not least, on state officials acting according to the 
public office they occupy, rather than in their personal capacity. 
In order to appraise the organisational means of the modern state as a particular 
political organisation, however, its authority and legitimacy becomes fundamental. 
Authority has been traditionally defined as:
. . . the probability of certain specific commands (or all commands) will be 
obeyed by a given group of persons . . . every genuine form of domination 
implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is an interest (based on 
ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience (Weber, 1978: 212, 
emphasis in original text).
Depending on its grounding, authority can be legal, charismatic or traditional. Legal 
authority rests on “an established belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (Weber, 1978: 
215). Traditional authority is based on the inviolability of traditions and the authority 
of those ruling under them. Charismatic authority derives from the exemplary 
character of an individual. While legal authority is the most frequently found in the 
modern state, other forms of authority can also be found in those political structures 
with rotating office holders, such as “Parliamentary and committee administration 
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and all sorts of collegiate and administrative bodies” (Weber, 1958: 3). This is the 
case, for instance, with the rotating Council presidency of the EU. Independently 
from its origins, an authority that receives popular acceptance is what constitutes 
‘legitimacy’. By combining these aspects, the term ‘legitimate authority’ refers to an 
effective authority that is accepted by those who are subject to it. Legislation, and 
public policy more broadly, are the primary means  by which the state’s legitimate 
authority is exercised. 
It is generally agreed upon that a state refers to people sharing a common government 
and territory, while a nation is generally defined as a community of people sharing a 
common language, culture, ethnicity, descent or history. It should be noted, however, 
that since the Peace of Westphalia, European states’ legitimate authority has been 
secured also through an intentional effort of coupling a government with its people 
in geographically demarcated territories that at least share and enforce a common 
predominant language, culture, and historical narrative. This effort, however, has been 
challenged to such an extent that some speak of the rise of a post-Westphalian model 
where
National governments are no longer the only source of policy authority . . . 
The bureaucratic administrative state also has been replaced by polycentric 
arrangements involving both public and private interests (Rizvi & Lingard, 
2011: 117).
Within the European region, examples of such polycentric arrangements are 
constituted by the pooling sovereignty of the EU, and its institutions.5 From an 
empirical viewpoint this raises the question of how European states can uphold 
legitimate authority while acquiring EU membership. Recent theories of the state, to 
which I now turn, can help elucidate this point. 
Recent Theories of the State
Although not exempt from controversies, a review of recent theories of the state 
highlights that 
The state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether as agent, 
instrument, organisation or structure, located apart from and opposed to 
another entity called society (Mitchell, 1991: 95, as cited in Pierson, 2004: 77).
Accordingly, the state is the site for different political agents to act intentionally 
and strategically; however access to such a site is gained by certain agents and not 
others, given their structural position or privilege. Among the most important factors 
giving or preventing access to the state are economic resources, political resources, 
knowledge and gender. 
Against this background, the traditional definition of the state as an ‘organised 
political power’ still holds true, however, the organisational means and modalities 
through which it exercises such power in diverse societies are always the resultant 
of contingent factors and global forces. 
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This perspective questions the traditional dichotomy between the self-reproductive 
nature of the state apparatus and the role of agency in transforming the state system. 
Poulantzas (1978), for instance, suggested that, as an “institutional ensemble”, the 
state has no power in itself. State power results from the balance between social 
forces that act within and upon such an ensemble, and which depends on particular 
institutional forms. Accordingly, class contradictions are reproduced within the state 
apparatus, as evidenced by public policies that are often incoherent and / or of a 
disorganised character. However, the complex dialectic between state structure and 
social forces, emphasised by Poulantzas, also produces a general (though contingent) 
political direction, which is the resultant of a ‘strategic’ organisation of the state. In 
other words, a general political direction in the exercise of state power does not result 
from a single logic but rather from a clash between diverse strategies and tactics. 
In this sense Poulantzas resorts to what one might call a strategic causality 
which explains state policy in terms of process of strategic calculation without 
a calculating subject (Jessop, 1990: 257).
A Strategic-Relational Perspective 
Further elaboration of the state as a “complex social process” (Jessop, 1990: 5) can 
be found in Jessop’s (1990, 2002, 2007) distinctive “strategic-relational” approach 
to the state. Jessop’s point of departure is the state as a set of institutions and system 
of political domination, according to the Marxist tradition. However, the relation 
between state institutional structures and class struggles for Jessop are always 
contingent, as determined by temporally and spatially defined social conjunctures. 
Jessop’s point of view abandons the Marxist view of a ‘relatively autonomous’ state 
with respect to forces located elsewhere, and he additionally rejects the supremacy 
of class and economy. Also, inspired by Poulantzas’ strategic causality, Jessop’s 
arguments consider the state as the resultant of intentional action through which 
political agents pursue particular ‘projects’; however such capacity 
. . . is not inscribed in the state system as such. Instead it depends upon the 
relation between state structures and the strategies which various [social] 
forces adopt towards it (Jessop, 1989, as cited in Pierson, 2004: 62). 
This results in a ‘dialectic duality’ between structure and agency. Structures are 
always spatially and temporarily defined horizons of actions defining the context 
in which agents’ strategically calculated and structurally oriented action is possible. 
Accordingly, political action is the resultant of the interplay between institutional 
materialities and agents’ interactions with others (Jessop, 1990). From this 
perspective, state power is a complex phenomenon that 
. . . can serve at best to identify the production of significant ‘effects’ . . . 
through the interaction of specific social forces within the limits implied in the 
prevailing set of structural constrains (Jessop, 2007: 29).
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Jessop’s emphasis of state ‘effects’ highlights the existence not of a unified state, 
but rather of structural and strategic factors that contribute to the realisation of 
(competing) state projects, from which some political strategies will be privileged 
over others at the time that they interact. Thus, while the structure upon which 
these effects rest is ‘determined’, the effects as such are at all times ‘contingent’. 
Accordingly, an analysis of state power requires attention to the organisation, modes 
of calculation, resources, strategies and tactics by different agents as well as relations 
between these agents, while taking into consideration both structural constraints and 
conjunctural opportunities from a ‘comparative advantage’ perspective. As a result, 
among viable structural alternatives at a given conjuncture, a situation, action or 
event is in the interest of a specific agent when it secures a net increase or smaller net 
decrease of the conditions that guarantee its existence (Jessop, 2007: 30).
These reflections suggest that state actions should not be attributed to the state 
as an originating subject but should be understood as the emergent, unintended and 
complex resultant of what rival ‘states within the state’ have done and are doing, on 
a complex strategic terrain (Jessop, 1990: 9).
In other words, the state is always the resultant of the balance between social forces 
that are spatially and temporally situated. This implies that rather than being embedded 
in the state system, the differential capacity of political agents to pursue their own 
interests within a time horizon is dependent on the complex relations between the 
strategies that these agents adopt, as well as on specific state structures. Thus the 
state cannot be reduced to an autonomous actor in relation to others, as its action is 
determined by the very nature of the broader social relations in which it is situated.
In line with this argument, the state simultaneously represents the site, the generator 
and the product of ‘strategic selectivity’. As a site of strategic selectivity, any given 
state’s type, form or regime is more or less accessible to certain political agents, and 
not others, depending on the strategies these agents adopt in their strive to power. 
As a generator of strategic selectivity, politicians and state officials adopt strategies 
to impose some kind of unity or coherence on the state’s activities. Finally, as a 
product of strategic selectivity, any given state’s type, form or regime always results 
from past political strategies and struggles, thus current political strategies embed 
past patterns of strategic selectivity as well as their reproductive or transformative 
potentials (Jessop, 1990, 2007).
In his later work, Jessop (2007) combined the dialogical relationship between 
structure and agency with that of ideation and materiality, recognising the relevance of 
discursive selectivity in the pursuit of strategic selectivity. From this perspective, the 
emergence, selection, retention, contestation and replacement of discourses, although 
based on social imaginaries, always resonate to a certain extent with the agents’ material 
experience, and thus provide cognitive templates that interact with strategic selectivity 
at the intersection between structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities.
In sum, in the same way that a given context is strategically selective – 
selecting for, but never determining, certain strategies over others – it is also 
discursively-selective – selecting for, but never determining, the discourses 
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through which it might be appropriated (Hay, 2001, Discursive selectivity: The 
place for ideas section, para. 6). 
Summing up, I argue that from a strategic-relational perspective any EU member 
state represents distinct political agents whose materiality results in an ensemble of 
institutions and organisations exercising power to serve specific functions. However, 
the organisational means and modality through which this ensemble exercises power 
at national as well as EU levels are by necessity geographically and historically 
determined. Legitimate authority remains a central concern for any member state to 
exercise power over its territory as well as over the extended European territory, but 
it no longer only relies on bureaucratic principles; it depends on strategic selectivity 
(structural and discursive) by privileged political agencies and the adoption of diversified 
means that are contextually relevant. Nonetheless, strategic selectivity (thus, member 
state activity) is dependent on the links or relations that a member state has with other 
institutions and organisations within and beyond its core ensemble, at national, inter-
national and regional levels. Accordingly, forms and mechanisms through which 
member states participate in the activity of the EU and its institutions (as well as the 
effects of such participation) are spatially and temporally determined by strategic 
and discursive selectivity. EU membership can act as a conjunctural opportunity for 
member states to (re)gain (national) legitimate authority, at the same time as it can act 
as a structural constraint, in favour of the EU, acting as a state-like institution. State-
like institutions define or implement collective decisions affecting member states, and 
their relative populations, in the name of a shared (inter-state) common interest. Klatt 
(this volume) depicts this occurrence via hard and soft law mechanisms. Further, as 
Reinalda and Kulesza (2006) recall, from a judicial perspective, even when ratified 
by member states on a voluntary basis, collective decisions still represent a formal 
agreement binding their signatories to cross-national cooperation. This underpins 
processes of European governance, to which I shall now turn attention. 
Member States and Multi-Scalar Governance
European governance makes reference to diverse modes of coordination of activities 
that are inter-dependent, thus suggesting that governing – the traditionally exclusive 
business of individual member states – is increasingly a matter of negotiated decision-
making that occurs within, as well as beyond and across, member states via formal as 
well as informal interactions with EU institutions and non-state actors. Still some of the 
‘blind spots’ of governance, which studies have more broadly defined (Lemke, 2007), 
also apply here. Of particular relevance is the assumption of the object of governance as 
pre-defined or independent of governance mechanisms, which in turn underestimates 
the role of strategic selectivity by a whole range of actors (see Jessop, 2007). In 
doing so, European governance is assumed by some to be a heterarchic alternative to 
hierarchic (state-centred) governing forms and mechanisms, with no due recognition to 
indirect forms and mechanisms of cooperative governance, within and across member 
states. When authority is contingent and historically constructed, and norms and ideas 
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are used as tools of power by member states, EU institutions and non-state actors, 
it is worth questioning the organisation of the conditions for European governance 
which contrast hierarchical (state-based) modes of governing. Jessop (1998, 2002) 
distinguished between three types of heterarchy or multi-scalar governance: 
 – Interpersonal exchanges (or meta-exchanges) that occur between individuals who 
may not have the mandate to make commitments on behalf of the organisations 
to which they belong;
– Self-organisation of inter-organisational relations (or meta-organisation), which 
represents a strategic alliance among institutions and organisations who share 
perceived joint interests and work to achieve mutual benefits; and
 – Inter-systemic steering (or meta-heterarchy) that also takes place among 
institutions and organisations but is used to strengthen mutual understanding and 
avoid negative repercussions of individual decisions upon others.
Although distinctive, these forms of multi-scalar governance are not mutually 
exclusive, and can support one another. 
In synthesis, by dismantling old assumptions that member states are major 
political actors and discrete sovereign unities, European governance, rather than the 
working of governments, has come to the surface. European governance highlights 
how governing is increasingly a matter of negotiated decision-making that occurs 
via interactions by a multiplicity of actors, who use norms and ideas as tools of 
power and authority. Still, with its primary focus on EU institutions, European 
studies sometimes dismiss member states as active players and the EU as a pooling 
sovereignty. A strategic-relational perspective to the state combined with a multi-
scalar governance approach moves beyond this impasse. Further, it  suggests at least 
three levels at which negotiation and coordination across member states (and an 
array of political agencies) and the EU (and its diverse political institutions) takes 
place: individual, organisational and inter-systemic. 
CONCLUSION
Institutional changes that have occurred at the EU level – with a view of the EU as an 
institution which pools sovereignty – and in its operational workings have increased 
EU political agency in education, yet have also redefined the contours of political 
agencies within member states. Broadly addressed under the label of Europeanisation, 
the ways these changes affect public policy work on adult and lifelong education is 
hard to capture. The main argument brought forward in this chapter to overcome this 
conundrum is to refocus attention on the reciprocal power relation between the EU 
and its members states, under European governance, through a process that glues and 
blends these elements together. Moving in this direction implies:
1. Recognition of the distinctive nature of EU policy formation processes and the 
outcomes of such processes that reverberate within international and national 
contexts.
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2. Acknowledgment of more subtle shifts in legitimate authority within the EU, both 
through the changing nature of its pooled sovereignty – relations between member 
states and EU – and through shifts in the relationships between and within the 
EU’s representative institutions (i.e., European Parliament, European Council 
and European Commission, Directorate General for Education and Directorate 
General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion).
3. Recognition that subtle shifts in authority are also occurring within member 
states, and their nationally representative institutions (i.e., parliaments and 
governments), and that these have an impact on EU-member state relations.
4. Appreciation of member states’ bargaining power, and the factors that affect their 
degree of success.
5. Attention to lobbying potentials and mechanisms that either directly or indirectly 
leverage both EU and national representative institutions.
On these premises, when we look at new government mechanisms, such as the OMC, 
not only as tools of European governance, but also as tools for understanding the 
system of governance these create at both inter-state and national levels, member 
states’ authority is not necessarily diminished or weakened as some claim. It is 
certainly triggered in ways that can also strengthen its authority within its own 
territory or expand it beyond national borders. Yet member states’ authority can no 
longer be interpreted according to traditional modes of understanding the modern 
state, as primarily based on legal authority. Here we need to appraise political 
intentions and strategies adopted by national representative powers inasmuch as they 
are influenced by business institutions, citizenship organisations, research institutes 
and policy consultancy agencies, and their representatives, who have an interest in 
adult and lifelong education. These agencies participate, either directly or indirectly, 
in material and ideational work carried out via new governance mechanisms. One 
way to go about it is to look at the organisation of the conditions for European 
governance, rather than hierarchical (state-based) modes of governing, and member 
states’ political space within such processes as consisting of political intentions 
and strategies by multiple agencies. Thus we can question individual and blended 
forms of multi-scalar governance that occur via interpersonal exchanges and inter-
organisational relations, which also lead to common EU policies on adult and lifelong 
education. Emblematic examples can be found in a series of initiatives undertaken 
under the Strategic Framework for European cooperation in Education and Training 
(ET2020) (CEU, 2009). For instance, according to the principle of the OMC, the 
Directorate General for Education and Culture has set up a Thematic Working Group 
on Financing Adult Learning in 2011 (DG EAC, 2011) and a Thematic Working 
Group on Quality in Adult Learning in 2012 (CEC, 2012). The topics for these groups 
were decided on from within DG EAC’s Unit B.2, which held responsibility for adult 
education and learning. Yet the staff at B.2 were either employed by the European 
Commission (EC) or seconded by member states, and hence embodied national 
knowledge and understandings about adult education and learning, and possessed 
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differential degrees of commitment to individual countries’ political priorities. When 
we look at the composition of the Thematic Working Groups, for the most part their 
members were directly appointed by member states, so even if differently composed, 
both consisted of representatives from national ministries of selected member states 
and partner countries, and individual experts representing a variety of organisations, 
including European agencies, international trade unions, and non-governmental 
organisations, either internationally or nationally-based. Additionally, the Working 
Group on Financing Adult Learning included an individual expert from UNESCO. 
However, both groups were moderated by external experts working for a private 
company (ICF GHK,  formerly GHK) that offered a series of consulting services to 
the Directorate General for Education and Culture. Accordingly, within these groups, 
representational coverage at an organisational level could constitute a strategic 
alliance among actors with perceived joint interests in achieving mutual benefits (e.g. 
the EU and UNESCO), or strengthening mutual understanding and avoiding negative 
repercussions of individual decisions upon others (e.g. trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations); at an individual level, however, not all national representatives and 
experts necessarily had the mandate to fully commit the organisations of which they 
are members. Further, both Working Groups also benefitted from exchanges with 
parallel groups of experts who won open calls for carrying out studies on the same 
topics of concern. These groups were composed of academics, researchers and private 
consultants from a variety of institutions and specific countries. 
Yet, interpersonal exchanges and inter-organisational relations within Education 
and Training 2020 are undergoing important changes. Since 2013 a network of 
national coordinators for adult learning has been put in place, with representatives 
from all EU executive bodies, while a new functionality for working groups’ 
organisation under the OMC is being considered.
In the meantime, the Directorate General for Research and Innovation 
commissioned a work on adult and continuing education from an Italian academic 
(EC-DGR&I, 2013), the results of which are receiving attention across Directorates 
and EU institutions. In part, this is due to an official hearing initiated by a member 
of the European Parliament, also from Italy.
Against these manifestations of multi-scalar governance, to deepen our 
understanding we should also appraise how interpersonal exchanges and inter-
organisational relations weaken, trigger or strengthen legitimate authority by 
specific political actors (within and across member states and the EU as a pooling 
sovereignty). We can do so, for instance, by questioning:
1. Which are the countries, institutions and individuals being represented (i.e., in 
steering and working groups, in commissioned work)?
2. Why these countries, institutions or individuals (and not others)?
3. What is their differential bargaining power (i.e., in terms of network relations 
with other countries, institutions or individuals) in relation to other participants 
(and non-participants)?
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4. What are the country, institutional or individual interests being represented? How 
are the issues and debates being prioritised within individual national, sectoral or 
institutional contexts?
5. What are the conjunctural opportunities or structural constraints for member 
states (and their array of political agencies) which offer authoritative backing to 
EU policy?
6. How do wider socio-economic and political events, such as the economic crisis 
that hit much of Europe in 2009 and the plethora of ‘austerity’ policies that 
followed, affect members states’ domestic conditions and priorities?
In conclusion, bringing back the state into examination of adult and lifelong education 
policies in Europe means raising a rather different set of questions from those so 
often addressed when looking at EU or national policies. Essentially, policies can no 
longer be studied either in isolation or upon the assumption of linear dependency – 
we overcome these by repositioning the state at the centre of our analyses.
NOTES
1 This contribution drawn on activity undertaken under the European Union’s Marie Curie funding 
scheme (grant agreement PIOF-GA-2011-297727). However, the views expressed herein are those of 
the author and not necessarily those of the European Union.
2 Article 6 has been added to the Treaty Establishing the European Community (now Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) in compliance with the amendments approved in 2007 at the 
European Council and signed by member states.
3 This article has remained unchanged in its wording (though it has been renumbered to article 149) from 
the first consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (1997), but it has been removed from 
the subsequent consolidated versions of the Treaty (2002, 2008 and 2010). Since 1992, in fact, this 
article (and the entire Chapter 3 on education, vocational training and youth to which it belongs) has 
been incorporated into the Treaty Establishing the European Community and has remained unchanged 
(but has been renumbered to article 149) in all its consolidated versions (1997, 2002, 2006).
4 According to the Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated text, 2002), the legal 
instruments used by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament in producing policy 
are: (1) regulations and (2) directives, binding on the member states to achieve results; (3) decisions, 
binding on those to whom they are addressed; and (4) opinions and recommendations, non-binding 
documents. However, also intergovernmental agreements, such as the Lisbon Agenda or the Education 
and Training 2010 programme (and follow-ups) signed by the Heads of states and government of the 
member states lay the foundation for a stronger political cooperation among member states.
5 These include: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, 
the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank 
and the Court of Auditors (TEU, 1992, Article 13).
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